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BRAD INWOOD
In 1957 John Raven announced that no one ever disputed the claim
that "Anaxagoras really believed in the infinite divisibility of matter."'
No doubt he was right about that, and Raven like all his predecessors
and most of his successors proceeded to interpret Anaxagoras' com-
plex and vaguely expressed theory of matter on the assumption .that
one central feature of it was the infinite divisibility of particles of
matter.
But times change, and we live in a more skeptical age. Malcolm
Schofield^ has recently challenged the claim that Anaxagoras used a
notion of infinite divisibility in his theory of matter. Unfortunately,
Schofield's skepticism is uncharacteristically timid here, and he never
provides a clear statement of his reasons for questioning the traditional
view, nor attempts a demonstration of its weakness or a sketch of
what the theory of matter would look like without this venerable
fixed point. Schofield restricts himself to redescribing it as "unlimited
smallness"^ and pointing out that "infinite divisibility" is not an
expression which represents ideas in which Anaxagoras shows an
interest.
Jonathan Barnes' recent discussion of Anaxagorean physics'*
' P. 377 in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers; first edition,
Cambridge 1957. In the second edition (1983, with additional material by Malcolm
Schofield), this claim is not altered (p. 367).
- An Essay on Anaxagoras (Cambridge 1980).
' P. 79. But infinite divisibility returns on p. 81.
^ In The Presocratic Philosophers, vol. 2 (London 1979). There is little change in
the second edition (in one volume, 1982).
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fills some of the gaps. For he argues that a central element in the
traditional view, the claim that Anaxagoras believed that matter had
particulate structure, is false. This, I think, is correct. For as Schofield
emphasizes, division of matter is not a prominent theoretical concept
in Anaxagoras' fragments;^ in its place we find mixture and separation,
which need not refer to particles of matter at all, but are equally
suited to the idea that matter exists in the form of non-particulate
stuffs which can be blended— as pastes or liquids are combined,
perhaps, rather than as grainy substances like salt and flour which
are sifted together.
I shall take as given, then, the view that Anaxagoras' notion of
the structure of matter does not include the belief that it is particulate.
On the traditional view, one reason why Anaxagoras believed in
infinite divisibility was that it was necessary to make the claim of
universal mixture (all is in all) consistent with the idea of particulate
matter. As William Mann points out in a recent article, abandoning
particles thus removes a powerful motivation for adopting a theory
of infinite divisibility.*^ Mann, unfortunately, fails to ask the obvious
question: did Anaxagoras, then, believe in infinite divisibility? He
tamely accepts the received dogma.
Further probing is still needed, and I want to do a bit of that
work in this paper. I will first buttress the view that there is no need
to posit infinite divisibility for Anaxagoras by outlining the reasons
for finding it prima facie implausible that he would believe in infinite
divisibility, and I shall suggest very briefly one reason why Anaxagoras
has been interpreted so often in the traditional way. This should keep
the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of the supporters of
the traditional view. Here I shall principally use observations made
by others. Second, I shall try out some ideas about what will replace
infinite divisibility in Anaxagoras' theory of matter. For Barnes has
seen that if particles, infinitely divisible, are banished, then a new
understanding of "indefinite smallness" is needed. He offers such an
interpretation himself; but I think that one can do better. Moreover,
'' For a different view, see D. Sider, The Fragments of Anaxagoras (Meisenheim am
Glan: Anton Hain 1981 = Beitrage fiir Klassische Philologie 118), pp. 56-57, which I
find unconvincing. Professor Woodbury suggests that Anaxagoras' term iiolpa contains
a reference to division. But this is not a necessary implication of the term. The
reference to cutting with an axe in fragment B 8 is a metaphor for separation, not
a literal reference to the division of matter.
^ "Anaxagoras and the Homoiomere," Phronesis 25 (1980), 246.
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as Mann properly stresses, "indefinite largeness" is as important to
Anaxagoras as is smallness. Any story about the former should work,
mutatis mutandis, for the latter. I hope that one merit of my own
interpretation over Barnes' is that it will account for the use of
largeness and other quantity terms, as well as smallness. The key
point, however, is that giving up infinite divisibility creates a need
for fresh hypotheses about smallness and largeness in the fragments
of Anaxagoras; the field for new speculation here is still wide open.
The idea that matter is infinitely divisible, however familiar it may
now be or may have been to Aristotle, is not an intuitively obvious
one, nor is it a natural one. One would not expect any given
philosopher to employ it without a definite motivation, either in the
work of someone else or in his own. The possibility that Anaxagoras
developed the notion as a result of the theoretical demands of his
own analysis of matter cannot be dismissed out of hand. But recent
observations have, as we have seen, removed the familiar theory
about how such a doctrine arose from Anaxagoras' own problems
and positions. Most scholars until recently (I think particularly of
Cornford, Raven, and Guthrie) have seen the external stimulus in
the works of Zeno of Elea. Zeno did develop several dialectical
arguments against the possibility of motion and plurality which turned
on the infinite divisibility of matter and space, and it is often thought
that Anaxagoras was reacting critically to these in putting forth his
own theory of the infinite divisibility of matter. But there are problems
in this traditional view, both philosophical and chronological.
First, as David Furley, Malcolm Schofield, and Jonathan Barnes
have argued,' the "response" of Anaxagoras to Zeno, if that is what
it is, is feeble indeed. Their observations need not be repeated in
detail. Anaxagoras, if he is responding to Zeno, is indulging in mere
counterassertion and not employing arguments against him. Furley,
in fact, points out that the similarities indicate, if anything, a response
by Zeno to Anaxagoras.^
And it is just as well that we need not view Anaxagoras as reacting
to Zeno, since recent work has indicated that Anaxagoras' writings
were probably produced earlier in the fifth century than used to be
assumed.^ The most powerful case on this point is made by Wood-
^ Barnes, p. 35, Schofield, pp. 80-82, David Furley, "Anaxagoras in Response to
Parmenides," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. 2 (1976), 76-80.
^ Op. cit. (above, note 7), p. 78.
^
J. Mansfeld, "The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian Period and the Date
of his Trial," Mnemosyne 32 (1979), 39-60; 33 (1980), 17-95, is the major exception
among recent authors. For discussion see L. E. Woodbury, "Anaxagoras and Athens,"
Phoenix 35 (1981), p. 306, n. 28.
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bury,'" who argues that Anaxagoras' philosophical impact began in
the 470s and that his activity at Athens was over by, at the latest,
450. It is noteworthy, Woodbury reminds us, that Plato represents
Socrates as having access only to Anaxagoras' book. By the time
Socrates was a young man the book of which we have fragments was
written and Anaxagoras was gone. Zeno, according to Plato, would
still have been able to talk with the young Socrates." Nothing in
Plato's picture of Athenian intellectual life in Socrates' youth en-
courages us to see Anaxagoras as replying to Zeno.'^
As to the absolute dates of Zeno's and Anaxagoras' books little
can be known. Both Schofield and Furley'^ point out the weakness in
the traditional argument that Anaxagoras wrote after 467 B.C., on
the grounds that his theory that the heavenly bodies are glowing
stones must have been influenced by the fall of the meteorite at
Aigospotamoi in that year. It is more likely that he wrote before the
meteorite fell, since he is credited with predicting its fall. This is
closer to the truth if the meteorite confirmed the theory rather than
suggesting it.
Furley and Barnes properly emphasize that all of the philosophical
characteristics of Anaxagoras are adequately accounted for if we see
him as reacting only to Parmenides. Schofield's book-length study
led him to similar views, and he sees Anaxagoras as an "archaic
sage," rather than as an up-to-date dialectician engaged in the
sophisticated debate of the mid-fifth century. O'Brien's detailed
examination of the relative dates of Empedocles and Anaxagoras
confirms this.''* Anaxagoras is the earlier thinker according to all of
the external evidence. Particular weight must be put on the evidence
of Alcidamas,'^ who made Zeno and Empedocles contemporaries and
pointed out that Anaxagoras had influenced Empedocles.
I conclude, then, that unless the best recent work on the subject
is all in error, there is no reason to suspect that Zeno influenced
Anaxagoras at all, and some to suggest that he in fact wrote after
Anaxagoras. At all events, we may take it that Anaxagoras wrote
'" See previous note. Note also Sven-Tage Teodorsson, Anaxagoras' Theory ofMatter,
Goteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1982, pp. 8-9.
'
' Although his book in defense of Parmenides is described as a product of Zeno's
younger days (Parmenides 128d-e).
'^ Teodorsson, pp. 70-71, supposes that Anaxagoras reacted not only to Zeno
but also to Leucippus.
'' Schofield, p. 34, Furley, p. 77.
'^ D. O'Brien, "The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles," yourna/ of Hellenic
Studies 88 (1968), 93-113.
'^ Diogenes Laertius 8. 56.
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independently of Zenonian influence. The external motivation for
Anaxagoras to develop a theory of the infinite divisibility of matter
is also gone.
Why, then, have so many scholars and philosophers been so willing
to see Anaxagoras in this light? In addition to the chronological error
with relation to Zeno, we may point to a feature of the Aristotelian
and Epicurean"' doxographical traditions. I refer to the tendency of
Aristotle and his commentators (especially Simplicius)" to group
Anaxagoras with the atomists because of certain alleged similarities
in their views about the apxou- In the Peripatetic scheme, Anaxagoras
and Leucippus and Democritus all held that the apxoci were aireipoL.
This is a tidy grouping, even though Aristotle correctly supposed
that the a-Ketpoi apxoct would be quite different in significance in the
two systems. Anaxagoras, on Aristotle's view,'^ held that the apxou
were an indefinite number of kinds of stuffs, while the atomists
believed in a literally infinite number of atoms. But the tendency to
see Anaxagoras as a believer in an infinite number of particles, which,
however, were not octoiiol, was so strong that Aetius, repeating perhaps
Theophrastus,'^ describes him in atomistic terms as believing in Xoyu)
de(jL>pr]Ta /xopta. So Anaxagoras becomes a non-atomistic particle theor-
ist, like Leucippus except that his particles are not aTop.oi. This
doxographical tradition is also prominent in Lucretius' famous ac-
count of Anaxagorean physics,'^" in which bones, for example, come
to be from "tiny and minute bits of bone" and flesh from "tiny and
minute bits of flesh," and so forth.
But this association with and alleged similarity to Leucippan ato-
mism is unsupported by Anaxagoras' own words. For there particles
are never mentioned.^' It is the doxographical habit of grouping
Anaxagoras with the atomists which introduces particles. And of
course, once particles are introduced into his system, it is inevitable
that they be interpreted as infinitely divisible, in order to account
"* See Teodorsson, pp. 20-21, who properly emphasizes both doxographic errors
throughout his short book.
" Simplicius, In Phys., p. 453. 1-3. 458. 26 ff., 461. 9 fF., 461. 30 - 462. 3, 1069.
20-25, 1120. 20-24, 1254. 20 ff., 1266. 33-36.
'» A 43.
'^ A 46; cf. Barnes p. 22. It is also possible that the Epicurean tradition is at work
here, since the terminology used is otherwise best attested for that school. Julia
Annas pointed out that at Sextus Pyrrh. hypot. 1 . 1 47 bfwiotitpri are mentioned alongside
atoms and ikaxitrra as candidates for being twc ovtwv aroixtux. This too suggests the
doxographical tendency of the Epicurean school.
2" A 44 = On the Nature of Things 1. 833-879.
^' The term nolpa is as close as one can get to an Anaxagorean term for particle.
See note 5 above.
22 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
for what he does say about the structure of matter, in particular to
maintain consistency with the claim that there is a portion of every-
thing in everything.^^
My own hypothesis about Anaxagoras' theory of matter can best
be tested by applying it to the preserved fragments in detail; it
proposes new and rather special interpretations for Anaxagoras' key
theoretical terms referring to quantities. I concede at the outset that
some of these suggested interpretations are strange; but there has
yet to be an interpretation of his theory which did not have some
strange and perhaps incredible feature, and I doubt that there ever
will be. It is obvious, to me at any rate, that some of the difficulty
of Anaxagoras' fragments derives from his attempt to say quite new
and difficult things with the limited resources of ordinary Greek,
without coining new technical terms. This would have made his book
difficult for his contemporaries too and helps to explain why it was
so easy for his theories to be misunderstood by later doxographers.
Some re-evaluation of his words is essential if any progress is to be
made in understanding his theory. So I ask the reader to ponder the
suggested meanings for familiar terms as an hypothesis, and to
consider the economy and efficiency of this hypothesis in accounting
for Anaxagoras' fragments in the context of fifth-century intellectual
history.
The reasons for the various suggestions I make about the meaning
of quantity terms in Anaxagoras will be clear in the course of the
discussion. But it will be helpful if I state at the outset the proposals
I am making. I intend to interpret the following Greek terms thus:
irXridoq: amount, the total quantity of any stuff found in the
universe.
(xeyedoq: largeness, the characteristic of being separated out and
so distinguishable from other stuffs.
aniKpoTr^q: smallness, the characteristic of being mixed and so
not distinguishable from other stuffs.
These suggested definitions have emerged from a reading of the
^'^ Aristotle follows out this line of reasoning in Physics 1. 4. Teodorsson, oddly
enough (pp. 74 fF.), argues that Anaxagoras employed the concept of infinite divisibility
but not that of particle. I should also emphasize at this point that although Aristotle's
discussions are the source of the particulate interpretation of Anaxagoras' theory
(note for example oyKoi at Physics 1. 4, 187a37) Aristotle himself seems never to
attribute to Anaxagoras the idea of infinite divisibility. In Physics 1. 4 he pursues a
line of thought based on his own reflections about Anaxagoras, and in the course of
this (187b7-188al8) introduces the idea in question. But in his actual accounts of
what Anaxagoras believed the suspect notion is not to be found.
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fragments themselves, with no prior assumptions about the meaning
of these terms, which are obviously central to Anaxagoras' theory.^^
The interpretation I propose is not the only one possible; in effect,
it competes with Barnes' view. I claim that it is more plausible and
compatible with the fragments than that interpretation. But if it
seems to be at least a serious contender, then my present aim will
have been accomplished. Now to the most important of the fragments.
Fragment one:
All things*^'' were together, indefinite both in amount and in smallness.
For the small too was indefinite. And since all things were together,
nothing was distinct because of smallness. For air and aither covered
all things, both of them being indefinite— for these things are greatest
among the totality both in amount and in greatness.
The first observation to make is about the word irXridoq, which I
render "amount." As others have seen,^^ there is no need to translate
it as "number" with its implications of countable units, at least not
in fifth-century Ionic prose. ^'^ But even if it is translated in that way,
it does not follow that particles are meant; it could, as Aristotle seems
'^' The unusual interpretation I propose for fikyedoq and a/uKpcnriq is not without
support of a sort from another philosopher, Empedocles, who is also trying to grapple
with Parmenides' legacy of argument. His "roots" are always the same in total
amount. Yet they dwindle {(pdivd) into each other when they are mixed together (by
love) and grow {av^trai) when separated (by strife): B 26.2. Surely "dwindling"
suggests becoming "smaller" and "growing" suggests becoming "larger" in much
the same sense which I propose for Anaxagoras. Of course, the One of Empedocles
also "grows" as the elements shrink (B 17.1, 17.16). But the One is not a permanent
thing meeting Parmenidean standards, as the roots and Anaxagoras' x/owara are. It
is not clear whether mixing and separation in Empedocles involve particles of matter.
This is perhaps suggested by Aristotle at De Sensu 441a3 If., where he seems to be
assimilating Empedocles to an atomistic theory, and at Metaphysics A, 984a9-l 1: ravra
yap ad dianivHv /cat ov yiyptaBai aW fi irXfidH koi oXiyorriTL. But the way in which the
mixture occurs does not affect my point here. Quite possibly Empedocles did not
explicitly address the question whether his theory involved particles, just as he seems
not to have thought through the question whether his theory of pores should commit
him to a belief in the existence of void.
^^ When marked with an asterisk, "things" is a direct translation of xPWotra.
^^ E.g. Barnes, p. 16; D. Lanza, Anassagora: Testimonianze e Frammenti, Firenze: La
Nuova Italia, 1966, ad loc.
'^'' Herodotus uses irXfidoc, for "amount" in this way; see 1.204.1 for a parallel to
Anaxagoras' phrase "indefinite in amount." -iroXvq, in the singular, means simply
"much," and irXfiOoq is the corresponding noun for this sense as well as for the sense
"many" which is expressed by the plural iroXXa. In addition, Henry Mendell points
out that Plato uses irXridoc, to govern mass nouns as well as count nouns, confirming
that such a use is quite respectable even in classical Attic prose. Examples (many
more could be found): Phaedrus 279c, Theaetetus I58d, Politicus 269b. Sider's inter-
pretation of irXrfioq, (pp. 45, 58-60) is complex and, in my opinion, implausible.
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to have seen, refer to the number of kinds of basic stuffs found in
the original mixture and now in the world we observe. Still, I prefer
the interpretation of it as referring to the total amount of each stuff,
for reasons which will become apparent.
Second, what is meant by "smallness" when it is applied to the
apxoiU the adrjXa xP^o^TOi of the mixture? We are told that "since
all things were together, nothing was distinct [evdrjXov] because of
smallness." Traditionally this is taken to mean that the particles are
simply too small to be seen
—
just like atoms. On the other hand,
Barnes, focussing on fragments 3 and 6, understands smallness
differently. It is not particles which are "small," according to Barnes,
but portions or shares in mixed substances. ^^ But this, while perhaps
making sense in fragments 3 and 6, is clearly out of place in fragment
1. It is preferable to develop a view of large and small which will
apply to all the fragments and which will have it refer to the xPWo^Ta
themselves, rather than to portions or shares of them. For that is
how Anaxagoras speaks in fragment 1; Anaxagoras nowhere refers,
not even in fragment 6, to small and large portions, as Barnes' view
demands, but always to portions of what is itself large or small.
Consequently we look elsewhere for an interpretation of smallness;
and we have an explanation drawn from Anaxagoras' own fragments
which points in a different and more satisfactory direction. In frag-
ment 4b we read, "before these things were separated off [sc. from
the mixture], when because all things were together no color [or
surface, xpo(.y]] was distinct either; for the commingling of all things
prevented this." The xPVP-^Ta meant are then specified:^® they are
the pairs of opposites, wet-dry, hot-cold, etc. In fragment 1 "smallness"
was responsible for the indistinctness; here the mixture is responsible
for the same feature. Therefore I would hypothesize that smallness,
for the xP^o^To^y is simply the condition of being thoroughly distrib-
uted in the mixture. There need be no reference to the size of
discrete particles, as the traditional theory requires, nor even, as
Barnes' view would have it, to the quantity of a portion expressible
numerically or at any rate algebraically. Similarly, "largeness," to
which reference is made presently, will on this hypothesis be the
condition of being separated off and so distinguishable; not bigness
of the particles or of the portions of a stuff. Barnes' interpretation,
in fact, introduces the idea of numerically expressible fractional shares
and apparently does so only to give sense to the idea of large and
^^ The idea of small portions first appears on p. 33.
^^ Earth and the airkptuxra seem to be distinguished from the opposites— because,
I think, they are reducible to them; earth, seeds, etc. are derivative. See below.
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small shares of a stuff. But not only is the idea of fractional shares
not even hinted at in the fragments; the concepts which Barnes uses
it to explain— "small" and "large" portions or shares— are also not
Anaxagorean.
Fragment 1 itself says something about the reason for the lack of
distinctness of things. It is because air and aither cover or dominate
the mixture. Here I must take a position on a contentious issue. ^^ I
do not think that air and aither are identifiable components of the
mixture; i.e. they are not xPVI-'-<xTa in the sense that the opposites
are. Rather, like earth and the seeds mentioned in fragment 4b, they
are only "virtually" present in the mixture, by which I mean that
the opposites needed to make them up are present. After all, fragment
2 tells us that air and aither have to be separated off from the mixture
^^ Barnes retains the view that real stuffs {iovra xpi7M«7-a) include many ordinary
macroscopic stuffs, such as air, bread, and cheese. As far as I can see, Anaxagoras
never says this. Aristotle does, but I think that he misunderstands Anaxagoras. My
own view, that the iovra xPVhi^o^'roi (i.e. the elemental entities which alone obey
Parmenidean rules of permanence) are only the opposites and that everything else
including the seeds, the so-called Empedoclean elements, and flesh, bone, etc. is
derivative and disobedient to Parmenidean rules of permanence, is close to Vlastos'
position ("The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras," pp. 323-53 in R. E. Allen and D.
J. Furley edd.. Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, vol.2, London 1975). For he holds that
the seeds, flesh, earth, etc. arf just the opposites; his account of the relation of seeds
etc. and powers on pp. 337-38 is attractive and, I believe, correct, although I suspect
that it is inconsistent with other statements he makes about the status of seeds etc.
But because he accepts the authenticity of fragment 10 (now put in some doubt by
Schofield, op. cit., pp. 135 ff. and "Doxographica Anaxagorea" Hermes 103 [1975],
1-24), Vlastos presents his own position in a manner which I find unclear if not
contradictory. For while denying that the flesh or the seeds of flesh, e.g., are anything
over and above the powers, he still maintains that they are just as "primordial" and
"elemental." This would be redundant and to my mind implausible. It seems to be
a result of three factors: (1) the continued acceptance of the authenticity of fragment
10; (2) a degree of reliance on the doxographical tradition, which I believe distorts
Anaxagoras' theory on just this point; (3) a failure to see that the term XPW" should
be restricted to the opposites in all but a very few cases where it is loosely used to
refer to perceptible objects too. My own view is that Anaxagoras held that all
macroscopic phenomenal entities are derivative and do not obey Parmenidean canons,
that they are mere (paiuontva to be explained by reference to the underlying a8r)Xa
which compose them— i.e. that they are epiphenomena of true oma. This interpre-
tation of Anaxagoras would give point to Aristotle's claim {De Caelo 302a28-b5, Gen.
Corr. 314a 24-30) that the "Empedoclean" elements are treated as derivative {avvBiTo)
by Anaxagoras. It would also help to explain the interest of Sextus (fragments 21,
21a, A 97; cf. Cicero, Academica 1. 44, 2. 100) in him as a believer in the unreliability
of sense perception in grasping the truth about the physical world. Less important,
perhaps, but still not negligible is the fact that Aetius mentions nbpia aifiaroc, ytvirqTiKct
in A 46, which shows that one branch of the dubious doxographical tradition
preserved an awareness that the apxai were not meant to be the same stuffs as the
macroscopic objects made up of them.
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too (here referred to as the surrounding "muchness"— to iroXv to
TTipuxov); and fragment 15 describes how earth emerges from the
separating off and moving together of the dense, wet, cold, and dark,
and how aither emerges by the same process from the rare, hot, and
dry. Fragment 16 has similar implications.
Fragment 15:
The dense and wet and cold and the dark gathered here, where earth
now is, but the rare and the hot and dry moved out to the forward
part of the aither.
Fragment 16:
From these things being separated off earth is compounded. For water
is separated off from the clouds and earth from the water and from
the earth stones are compounded by the cold and these [i.e. the
stones] move out more than water.'"
Earth, air, etc. are in the mixture only in the sense that the
opposites (i.e. the xP^M^^a) sufficient, when separated, to make them
up are in the mixture. These non-elemental stuffs (i.e. the opposites
which constitute them) can be separated off, and then earth, etc.,
will appear. "Seeds" are probably of similar status; i.e. they are the
presence in the mixture of the opposites sufficient to produce, when
separated, the observable object of which it is said to be the seed.
The term "seeds" need not, as Barnes stresses,^' suggest a discrete
particle, although there must be something special about the seed.
Perhaps observable objects (like men and trees) which are individuated
and countable come from seeds, while stuffs like earth, air, etc. are
said to come directly from the "earth" which is in the mixture in
the form of the appropriate opposites. ^^ To say that earth is in the
mixture means only that there is enough dense, wet, cold, and dark
in it to produce what we see as earth; to say that the seed of x is in
it is to say that there is enough of each of the needed opposites in it
to produce x.
The reason why the virtual presence of air and aither helps to
"• Barnes (n. 18, pp. 295-96) denies that these two fragments imply the non-
elemental character of earth, aither, etc., following on this point Michael Stokes ("On
Anaxagoras," Archiv fur Geschichle der Philosophie 47 [1965], 218-21, 16-19). But
Stokes and Barnes, like Lanza and everyone else who relied on Diels' edition of
Simplicius, believed that (?; 7^) in fragment 15 was an emendation; thus they could
dismiss it. Sider however {op. cit., p. 115) points out that 7^ is in fact found in n<ery
manuscript of Simplicius; the words of Anaxagoras pretty clearly do imply that the
opposites are elemental and earth etc. are not.
''
P. 21.
'^ Perhaps, as Schofield suggests (pp. 126 fF.), only living things grow from seeds.
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make the mixture indistinct is presumably that the qualities which
make up these visible manifestations are in themselves more indeter-
minate to perception than others. The dominance of them in the
mixture, therefore, tends to account for the indistinctness of the
evenly mixed whole. The last sentence of fragment 1 , then, supports
the claim that these things are indefinite in amount and it does so
by appealing to observable facts about the present, separated state
of the world. For now (note the change in tense) "these are the
greatest among the totality of things, both in amount [irXridoc] and
in greatness [n'eyedoc]." Thus fragment 1 shows the inadequacy of
interpreting TrXridoq as number; air and aither may be the largest
visible masses, but they are not the most numerous. Moreover, on
the proposed interpretation the contrast between TrXrfdoq and ixeyedoq
is meaningful. These two things are both the greatest in total amount
(irXfidoq) and now the most separated (greatest in n'eyedoq).
Of course, only when the separation has occurred, now rather than
then, can one refer to greatness or largeness. For the separation has
produced discernible, countable bodies. The revolution which causes
the separation is to be envisaged as beginning in the center of what
is now the cosmos and expanding outwards. ^^ The surrounding
remainder, therefore, is still in the primordial state of mixture; and
this mass is indefinite in amount, as fragment 2 tells us.
For both air and aither are separated off from the "much" which
surrounds; and what surrounds is, itself, indefinite in amount.
This is a very old picture of the cosmogonic process— going back at
least to Anaximander—and Anaxagoras' acceptance of it hardly
singles him out as a revolutionary thinker. The terms ttoXv and TrXridoc,
here may thus be translated in accordance with our hypothesis, giving
them no reference to countable bits or shares.
So far I have said nothing about the central oddity of Anaxagoras'
system, his claim that in some sense the total mixture of all the
XPVuara or basic elements in his system is still a feature of our
present world of separated and differentiated objects, of "large"
objects as I am interpreting the term. This claim, of course, is the
key move in Anaxagoras' attempt to deal with Parmenides' demon-
stration that nothing could come to be from what is not or vanish
into what is not. There could be no "coming into being" or "being
destroyed" of any thing, be it substance or attribute (to use anachronis-
tic terms). So these apparent phenomena had to be reduced to a
derivative status, by interpreting them as the "mixing together" and
^^ See fragment 12.
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"distinguishing" of the xPWOira which truly exist and meet Parmen-
idean standards of permanence. Fragment 17 summarizes the position
Anaxagoras' theory is meant to support:
On coming to be and being destroyed the Greeks do not hold correct
opinions. For no thing* comes to be nor is destroyed, but is mixed
together and distinguished from existing things*. And thus they would
correctly call "coming to be" being mixed and "being destroyed"
being distinguished.
Since there can be no radical, genuine change and since observation
tells us that virtually anything can emerge from anything else even
now, as a spark from flint, water from stones (in dripping caves), air
from water and flesh from food, Anaxagoras concluded that it must
still be the case that everything is in everything. This is perhaps an
unnecessarily sweeping generalization, since there are some emerg-
ences which do not occur, but it is in keeping with Anaxagoras' bold
speculative temperament. Besides, as Simplicius pointed out (A 45),
if you follow a chain of emergences through serially it may perhaps
turn out that all things do emerge from all things indirectly. But
whether even this is true is an empirical question which neither
Anaxagoras nor Simplicius (nor I) had the patience to try to answer.
It is this requirement, imposed by the defense of change in a
Parmenidean framework, that all things still be in all things which
gives Anaxagoras' system its unique character and his interpreters
the greatest need for ingenuity. Here we must look closely at fragments
3, 5, and 6. These fragments present the quantity terms we have
been examining in a new light and will put any hypothesis about the
meaning of smallness, bigness, and "muchness" to its most severe
test.
Let us look first at fragment 3, which Simplicius explicitly says is
about the apxai, i.e. the iovTa xPW<^to(-
Nor is there something which is itself the least of the small, but it
[the small] is always lesser (for what is cannot not be); but also, there
is always a greater than the great. And it [the great] is equal in amount
to the small, but each is, with respect to itself, both great and small.
Let me point out first that this is one of the fragments which has
been thought to represent Anaxagoras' response to Zeno. Indeed,
Zeller inserted an explicit reference to division into the fragment by
emending the admittedly difficult to nrj in to yap ebu ovk €<jtl to ht)
ovK (Luai to TOfiy: what is cannot not be by division. This emendation
is widely rejected on the textual level, although Diels-Kranz persevere
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by saying that the idea of division is easily supplied from the context.
But is this so?^'*
"Nor is there something which is itself the least of the small." On
my hypothesis this states that there is no limit to how thoroughly
things can be mixed (while for Barnes it states that there is no limit
to how small a portion can be taken for consideration; but this raises
many problems, including one about how one could individuate,
count, or measure, such portions or shares; no such measurement is
needed on my interpretation). "The small" is what is well distributed
in a mixture; the term applies to xfiV^^-oiTot, not to portions or shares
{noXpai). And if everything is to come from everything, even on the
observable level, then there must be a bit of each XP^M« in each
thing. And if the hot, for example, is to be in ice,^^ then there will
be very little of it indeed: it must be very well mixed. To allow for
all possible cases, we must set no limit to the thoroughness of the
mixture. The point of the explanatory parenthesis ("for what is
cannot not be") will be that unless this kind of mixture is possible,
everything cannot be in everything, which would mean that anything
could not emerge from anything, which would mean that some cases
of change would entail radical coming into being or destruction (i.e.
what is would not be). But this is impossible, according to Parmenides;
so this kind of mixture must be possible. Thus on my reading the
observation that "what is cannot not be" is apposite here— it is not
the "simple truism" innocent of Eleaticism which it turns into on
Barnes' view.^^
The statement that there is always a greater than the great follows.
For the great (or the big) is what is separated off, and if there is
always more of x in y, then you can in principle separate more of it
off, producing a "bigger" product. The statement that the big is
equal to the small in amount also follows. For if it is always possible
to get more x out of y, the separated and the unseparated x must
both be indefinite (aTrttpoi/). As such they are "equal" in amount.
For it is reasonable to suppose that two amounts, both being indefinite,
are "equal" even if one does not give this a sophisticated arithmetical
^^ If emendation is needed, Schofield's excision (pp. 156-57, n. 15) of to is by far
the preferable attempt. Teodorsson's (p. 72) and Sider's (pp. 54-57) revival of rofiy
tiT) ovK aval is a superfluous intrusion into the text until we have independent reasons
for crediting Anaxagoras with the idea of infinite divisibility.
^^ Or in the cold— I do not think that it matters much whether the slogan "all
in ail" uses the word "all" univocally or applies it first to xP'?M«i'« and second to
observable entities. In so far as the latter are derivative, as I think, that they are, the
distinction is not significant.
3e
P. 34.
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precision. Here again TrXfidoq can refer to a non-countable amount,
not to a countable plurality of particles (which are infinitely divisible),
nor to a plurality of portions or shares expressible in numbers or
algebraic symbols, as Barnes' view would hold.^'
The fragment concludes, ^^ "with respect to itself each thing is
both great and small." The difficulty here is to decide what "each"
refers to. Is it "each XP^M« ' ie. each of the apxai? This is what the
context might suggest. Or is it "each thing" in the sense of macroscopic
objects? Or "each of the big and small"? The latter is less likely in
that one would expect tKocTtpov, although it would give the word a
referent in the immediate context, which neither of the other options
provides. On balance the question may not be too important, as the
sense of the fragment is underdetermined anyway. Still, I prefer the
first interpretation, if only because Simplicius tells us that this fragment
is about the apxocir'^
With respect to itself, one might say, each thing is large insofar as
it is separated off into identifiable objects, and small insofar as it is
not, being mixed either in the inpuxov or with all the other xPVfJ-OiTa.
This would be the result of taking "each" to refer to the xPW^^toc
and adopting my hypothesis. The hot, in its totality, is both large and
small simply because some of it is separated off and some of it is not.
On this interpretation, therefore, fragment 3 will be referring to a
time after the cosmogonic separation has begun; for otherwise there
would be nothing "large" in the postulated sense. But this already
follows from my interpretation of the rest of the fragment.
Fragment 5 also deals with this stage: "These things having been
distinguished thus," it begins. It goes on to deal with what is true of
all the xPVf^otra, presumably taken distributively.
These things having been distinguished thus, one must recognize that
all are in no way lesser or more (for it is impossible [lit. unmanageable]
for there to be more than all) but all are always equal.
Each one is always equal to itself, being neither less nor greater than
it is. It is better to see this as repeating the main point of fragment
3, that each xPVf^^ has equal bigness and smallness, rather than to
*' On both of these views Anaxagoras comes out as holding a suspiciously
sophisticated, although approximately correct, view about the equality of all infinite
sets— see, for example, Barnes, p. 35; Vlastos, pt. Ill and n. 75, and C. Strang, "The
Physical Theory of Anaxagoras," pp. 361-80 in Allen and Furley (above, note 29).
Such a modern insight is hard to attribute to our "archaic sage," who mentions
neither particles, nor small and large portions/shares, nor sets of such entities.
^« SeeSider, p. 61.
^^ This is Barnes' preference too.
Brad Inwood 31
take it as merely saying tautologically that there are as many kinds
of xP^^^-dTot as there are.
Fragment 6 continues the exploration of the characteristics of
matter when separation has begun. In particular, it deals with an
important corollary of the thesis that total mixture is always a fact
about the xPVf^ocra despite separation, viz. the claim that nothing is
totally isolated {xoopiadrivaL) from other things. Thus it provides the
groundwork for fragment 8 and, less obviously, for fragment 7 which
says that one does not know the amount of things separated off either
in word or in fact. This ignorance is inevitable if one cannot isolate
and count discrete bits of matter or even distinguishable portions.
But to return to fragment 6:
(A) And since there are shares of the great and the small equal in
amount, in this way too all would be in all. Nor can it/they/something'"'
be isolated, but all have a share of each. (B) Since the least cannot
exist, it/they/something could not be isolated nor come to be by
itself, but just as in the beginning, so now, all are together.
The first point (A) Anaxagoras is making is that the equality of shares
{nolpaL) or portions of the big and small (i.e. the distinguished or
separated and the unseparated parts of each XP^M« or stuff) is a
reason for holding the thesis of total mixture. Since on the present
interpretation the equality in amount of big and small is a statement
of the perpetual possibility of further separation, this really is a
ground for holding the thesis of total mixture. For total mixture is
made necessary, among other reasons, by Anaxagoras' belief in the
perpetual possibility of further separation. Without such a belief, a
central reason for believing that total mixture still is the case, after
separation as well as before, would disappear.
The second point made (B) is that the fact that there is no least
(as asserted in fragment 3) is a reason for holding that the total
isolation of a XP^M« is impossible. It is because "there is no least,"
i.e. on my interpretation because there is no limit to how well
something can be blended, that we believe that isolation is impossible
and so that total mixture is still the case. Since the blending of one
XP7)m« into another cannot be limited, isolation or separation of a
XPWci cannot be completed.
Here we may claim an advance over the traditional interpretation
of fragment 6, which Schofield follows,"" and over Barnes.*^ For on
these readings the possibility of indefinite or infinite smallness of
''° It is unclear what the subject of the verb is or whether it might be impersonal.
^' Pp. 91-93.
"2 P. 36.
32 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
countable particles or portions must be taken, not as a reason for
holding the non-isolation thesis, but as asserting a facilitating condi-
tion, as stating that one reason for not holding it does not obtain. For
on the traditional understanding of smallness (to which Barnes seems
to revert in despair), a limit to it, i.e. a form of atomism, would make
it impossible to accept total mixture. On such an interpretation
Anaxagoras is only entitled to conclude "it could be the case that it
is not isolated," not the stronger "it could not be the case that it is
isolated." On the present interpretation the stronger reading, which
is wanted here, ?5 justified.
The final sentence of fragment 6 is difficult on all interpretations;
indeed Barnes"*^ trivializes it. "And many things are present in all,
and [these things are] equal in amount in the greater and lesser of
the things separated off." I would expand it thus: in all things there
are many xP^M^^-o: (an understatement) and these xpv^i-<^toc are equal
in amount in both the greater and the lesser of the objects separated
off. The equality in amount of xPV^J-Cira in anything follows well
enough, but the terms greater and lesser must, I fear, be interpreted
differently here than they are when used in reference to xPVIJ-ocra.
For now they are used of the macroscopic distinct objects, not of the
XP^P-otTa themselves, and therefore they must have the ordinary sense
of big and small. This ambiguity of quantity terms, depending on
whether they are applied to macroscopic objects or to xp^P-^tol is an
annoying feature of Anaxagoras' style;*^ but it is not unparalleled.
For even the term xPVPoc is occasionally used of objects on the
macroscopic level,''^ although usually it refers to the stuffs or apxai
which are subject to total mixture and are the genuine, fully real
entities {eovra xPVP<^TOi) which obey Parmenidean rules of perma-
nence.
Here I must conclude. Although the fragments have not been
exhaustively reviewed, I have touched on the most difficult texts, the
ones which provide the most rigorous test for my theory about the
meaning of "small" and "large" in Anaxagoras. I believe that the
rest of the fragments can be readily fitted into the framework
provided. I should briefly review what I think are the strengths of
this interpretation. Anaxagoras himself never speaks of division,
infinite or otherwise (except for the figurative reference in fragment
8) and it is historically implausible that he should have conceived of
'' P. 36.
'•' Also found in fragment 12, p. 38. 4-5 DK. See also niyiara in fragment 1,
used in the ordinary sense.
^' As in fragment 9 (where vw signals the atypical usage) and possibly in fragment
17, p. 40. 21 DK.
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infinite divisibility. His central concepts are mixture and separation,
producing distinctness or indistinguishability of basic stuffs such as
hot and cold. He gives one clear hint himself in the surviving fragments
about how the quantity terms "small" and "large" are to be inter-
preted when they refer to the basic stuffs, and this hint involves only
the mechanisms of separation and mixture. I have tried to show that
this hint can be followed out consistently in the interpretation of the
fragments. If I am correct, there are no references to small and large
countable particles of matter in the fragments, or even to numerically
expressible smaller and larger portions of stuffs. This, I think, is
more what we should expect of an Ionian physicist who responded
first to Parmenides' challenge to the concept of change, without
reference to the work of Zeno or Leucippus. The resulting theory is
strange; but Anaxagoras will be that on any interpretation. The
theory has a good chance of being closer to the truth, I suggest, than
other currently held theories about Anaxagoras, if only because its
strangeness goes further toward providing an interpretation of his
work which is internally consistent and compatible with his position
in the historical development of Greek thought. ''^
University of Toronto •
^''
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